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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS
STATE OF UTAH
ALDRICH, NELSON WEIGHT,
& ESPLIN,
Case No. 92-A-0247
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Priority No. 7
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Department of Employment
Security,
Appellee.
BRIEF OF APPELLANT
JURISDICTION
The Court of Appeals has jurisdiction in.this matter pursuant
to §78-2a-3(2), Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as amended.
(2)

The Court of Appeals has appellate jurisdiction,
including jurisdiction of interlocutory appeals, over:
(a)

the final orders and decrees resulting from formal
adjudicative proceedings of state agencies or
appeals from the district court review of informal
adjudicative proceedings of the agencies, except
the
Public
Service
Commission,
State
Tax
Commission, Board of State Lands, Board of Oil,
Gas, and Mining, and the state engineer;...
STATEMENT OF ISSUES

The following issues are presented for review:
1.

Did the Board of Review err in finding the hearing before

the Administrative Law Judge lasted approximately four (4) hours
rather than in excess of 15 hours as was shown by the evidence
submitted by Appellant?
2.

Was the claimant below, Abraham Karbakhsh, denied "due

process" within the meaning of R562-18b-3.S, which would preclude

in some other way an opportunity for due process?
3-

Under Section 11 of Article I of the Constitution of Utah,

is that limitation of attorney's fees as applied in this case an
effective denial of a remedy by due course of law?
4.
due

Is a limitation of attorney's fees effectively a denial of

process

of

law

pursuant

to

Section

1 of

the

Fourteenth

Amendment to the United States Constitution?
The standard of review for each issue stated above is as
follows:
(A)

In considering

an appeal

from

a state

agency,

the

standard of review is that an appellate court may grant relief if
the agency action is based upon a determination of fact made or
implied by the agency that is not supported by substantial evidence
when viewed in light of the whole record before the*, court (§63-46b16(4) (g), Utah Code Annotated).

Substantial

evidence

is such

relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to
support a conclusion.

Johnson v. Dept. of Emp. Security, 782 P.2d

965 at 968 (Ut. Ct. App. 1989).
(B)

Issues 2, 3 and 4 above, constitutional questions are

characterized as questions of law, and under sub-section (4)(d) of
§63-46b-16, Utah Code Annotated, agency determinations of law,
which

include

interpretations

of

the

state

and

federal

constitutions, and are to be reviewed under a correction of error
standard, giving no deference to the agency's decision.

Questar

Pipeline Co. v. Utah State Tax Commission, 817 P.2d 316 (Ut. 1991).

2

STATEMENT OP THE CASE
Appellant
Kenneth

represented

Abraham

Karbakhsh

A. Major, Administrative

in a hearing

Law Judge, to determine Mr.

Karbakhshfs eligibility for unemployment benefits.
had been

charged with theft by deception

benefits under

§35-4-5(b)(2)

before

Mr. Karbakhsh

as a basis to deny

of the Utah Code.

However, the

charges were dismissed at the preliminary hearing and the case and
the reasons for denial of benefits were considered under §35-45(b)(1), Utah Code Annotated.
Mr. Karbakhsh sought counsel to represent him in his claim for
unemployment benefits and originally retained counsel in the Salt
Lake City area.
to

a

point

and

The Salt Lake City counsel progressed in the case
then

Mr.

Karbakhsh

approached

Appellant

and

indicated that his Salt Lake counsel was too expensive and that he
could not afford to go forward with pursuit of his unemployment
compensation claim under the arrangements he had with his Salt Lake
counsel.

Mr. Karbakhsh solicited an employment agreement * with

Appellant and was advised that Appellant would provide two (2)
attorneys, one (1) of which had successfully represented him in the
criminal charges and that the total fee would be Four Thousand
Three Hundred Dollars

($4,300.00).

Mr. Karbakhsh accepted the

employment agreement and paid Appellant Four Thousand Three Hundred
Dollars ($4,300.00).
In sharp contrasts to the usual hearing, this hearing was some
15 hours of hearing time continued twice to hearing dates one week
apart.

The employer called seven (7) of its paid employees as
3

witnesses, and one (1) former employee and a third-party witness,
in presenting its case. Following the hearing, Appellant submitted
its claim for attorney's fees in the amount of Four Thousand Three
Hundred Dollars
attorneys

for

($4,3 00.00) which included the time of two (2)
most

of

the

15

hours

of

hearing

time.

The

Administrative Law Judge limited fees to One Thousand Four Hundred
Thirty-six and 50/100 Dollars

($1,436.50), 25 percent

(25%) of

claimant's maximum unemployment entitlement of Five Thousand Seven
Hundred Forty-six Dollars ($5,746.00).
to the

Board

of Review which

Judge's

decision; however,

Appellant sought an appeal

affirmed

the

Board

the Administrative
of Review

erred

in

Law
its

statement finding that the attorneys attended only four (4) hours
of hearing time.
ARGUMENTS
POINT I
THE BOARD OF REVIEW ERRED IN FINDING THAT THE HEARING BEFORE THE
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE LASTED APPROXIMATELY FOUR (4) HOURS.
In its Decision dated July 27, 1992, the Board of Review
erroneously found that the hearing before the Administrative Law
Judge

"lasted

approximately

four hours

and

the

several consultation sessions with the claimant."

attorneys

had

In the Petition

for Approval of Fee submitted by Appellant, there is an itemized
statement

of

legal

separate hearings.
1992,

and

lasted

services,

including

entries

for three

(3)

The first hearing occurred on February 20,
4.5

hours.

The

second hearing was held

February 27, 1992, and lasted 4.3 hours.

The third hearing was

held on March 6, 1992, and lasted 4.0 hours.
4

on

The total time

involved in hearings alone was approximately 13 hours.
time

in

hearings

between

approximately 2 3 hours.
hearing

lasted

less

Appellant's

two

(2)

The total

attorneys

was

The Board of Review concluded that the
than

one-third

of

the

actual

time.

Correspondingly, the Board of Review allowed attorney's fees equal
to approximately one-third of the amount agreed upon between Mr.
Karbakhsh and Appellant.

Arguably, the grant of a lower fee is

consistent with the Board's finding that less time was involved
than actually was involved.

Thus, Appellant contends that the

erroneous conclusion of the Board of Review that only four (4)
hours

were

involved

in

hearing

of

this

matter

before

the

Administrative Law Judge, necessarily led to the Board's conclusion
that a lower fee was justified.
The matter should be reversed and/or remanded with directions
to correct the findings consistent with the record in this case.
POINT II
APPELLANT IS ENTITLED TO A REASONABLE ATTORNEYS FEE AND THE
ATTORNEYS FEE AWARDED BY THE BOARD OF REVIEW IS UNREASONABLY LOW
At the hearings before the Administrative
employer, WordPerfect

Corporation, hired

two

Law Judge, the

(2) attorneys to

represent its interests and made available seven (7) employees and
one (1) prior employee as witnesses in the case. Mr. Karbakhsh had
the right to have equal access to counsel of his choosing to fairly
and thoroughly represent his interests before the Administrative
Law Judge.

A case addressing these issues was decided by the

Supreme Court in Thatcher v. Industrial Commission, 207 P. 2d 178
(Ut. 1949) .

In Thatcher, the widow of Morris Dewayne Rosenbaum
5

filed a claim for compensation of her deceased husband upon the
ground that when he was injured, he was employed by "Sholty."
There was an issue of whether or not the deceased was employed by
"Sholty" or "Seashore." The Commission decided that at the time of
his injury, the deceased was employed by "Seashore" and therefore
not

covered

by

workman's

compensation.

Mrs.

Rosenbaum

then

consulted with plaintiffs, Thatcher, who agreed to take her case
and seek a reversal of the Commission's order denying the award.
The plaintiffs

also

agreed

to accept

a reasonable

determined if plaintiffs were successful.

fee to be

Plaintiffs eventually

were successful and agreed upon a fee of One Thousand
($1,000.00) with Mrs. Rosenbaum.

Dollars

On remittitur, the Commission

vacated its previous order denying the award and entered an order
awarding to the dependents of the decedent benefits in the sum of
Seven

Thousand

Two

Hundred

Fifty

Dollars

($7,250.00).

The

commission also fixed the fee of the plaintiffs for legal services
at

Three

Hundred

Seventy-five

Dollars

($375.00).

Plaintiffs

thereupon filed with the Industrial Commission their Application
for Rehearing on the ground that the sum of Three Hundred Seventyfive Dollars ($375.00) was inadequate for the services performed
and that One Thousand Dollars ($1,000.00) was a reasonable fee.
The Petition for Rehearing was denied by the Coirmission and the
matter was appealed to the Supreme Court.

The Supreme Court set

aside the order of the Commission and remanded the case for further
proceedings

not

inconsistent

with

Opinion.

6

the views

expressed

in the

Among the views expressed by the Supreme Court regarding the
reasonableness of attorney's fees are the following:
While attorneys may not hope to be compensated to the
full measure of their time and work, they must not be
limited to such niggardly fees that they cannot afford to
accept compensation cases. And particularly, where it
has become necessary to carry a compensation case to this
Court should the Commission be at least moderately
liberal in the allowance of attorney's fees....
It thus transpires that while the attorney and client
compensation cases may have freedom of contract to agree
on a fee for services performed by the attorney before
the Industrial Commission and before the Supreme Court,
such contract is not binding on the Commission and no
greater sum may be charged than that fixed by the
Industrial Commission, if the fee so fixed by it is
within the limits of reasonableness even though the
parties have agreed on a larger sum....
In determining the amount of the fee, it is proper to
consider: (1) the time and labor required, the novelty
and difficulty of the questions involved and the skill
requisite properly to conduct the cause; (2) whether the
acceptance of employment in the particular case will
preclude the lawyer's appearance for others in cases
likely to arise out of the transaction and in which there
is a reasonable expectation that otherwise he would be
employed, or would involve the loss of other employment
while employed in the particular case or antagonisms with
other clients; (3) the customary charges of the Bar for
similar services; (4) the amount involved in the
controversy and for the benefits resulting to the client
from the services; (5) the contingency or certainty of
the compensation; and
(6) the character of the
employment, whether casual or for an established and
constant client.
No one of these considerations in
itself is controlling.
In this case, counsel spent a combined total time of 41.9
hours from the time they were retained by Mr. Karbakhsh to and
including the decision of the Department of Employment Security.
Appellant has spent considerable additional time in pursuing its
petition for approval of the fee and now in this appeal.
the

number

of

hours

spent

by

Appellant
7

in

Based on

representing

Mr.

Karbakhsh before the Department of Employment Security and based
upon an agreement reached between Mr. Karbakhsh and Appellant for
compensation for legal services, Appellant contends that it is
reasonable that it be awarded attorney's fees of Four Thousand
Three Hundred Dollars ($4,300.00), an amount consistent with hourly
rates charged by attorneys practicing in the Utah County area, and
consistent with the amount of Mr. Karbakhsh agreed to pay counsel.
POINT III
ABRAHAM KARBAKHSH, THE CLAIMANT BELOW WAS DENIED DUE PROCESS OF
LAW WITHIN THE MEANING OF R562-18B-3.5.
The claimant in the proceeding below was effectively denied
his

rights

attorney's

to

due

fees as

process

of

law

interpreted

by

the

or dictated

limitation
by

the

on

the

Industrial

Commission of Utah. The Utah Administrative Code provides at R562-18b-3.5 as follows:
Fees will not be approved in excess of 25% of the
claimant's maximum unemployment benefit entitlement
unless such a limitation would preclude the claimant from
pursuing an appeal to the Supreme Court or would preclude
in some other way an opportunity for due process.
(Emphasis Added.)
According to the administrative code, if the 25 percent (25%)
limit would preclude an appeal or preclude in some other way an
opportunity for due process, the 25 percent (25%) ceiling on the
fees allowable to attorneys for the claimant may be avoided.

In

allowing for higher attorney's fees in the event an appeal was
taken, the drafters of this provision

recognizee that unusual

circumstance justified the setting aside of the limitation on fees.
Implicit in the notion of allowing higher fees ii the appeal is
8

that the number of hours of attorney time involved would be far
more than in the usual case and that because of the extra time
commitment for attorneys in a case, there would be a substantial
dis-incentive to protect the rights of a claimant if there was no
adequate compensation for the additional time required to prosecute
the appeal.

Similarly in this case, the amount of attorney time

involved was far more than that involved in the usual case.

In

this case the hearing lasted at least 13 hours and was continued
over a period of two (2) weeks.
The Administrative Code provides that the due process of law
may justify avoidance of the limit.

Under the Constitution of the

United States, the proceeding or hearing requisite to due process
must be appropriate, fair, adequate, and such as is practicable and
reasonable

in

the

particular

case.

It

must

be

an

orderly

proceeding, adapted to the nature of the case, in which the person
to be affected has an opportunity to defend, enforce, and protect
his rights.

The fundamental requirement of due process is the

opportunity to be heard at a meaningful time and in a meaningful
manner.

Since the essential reason for the due process requirement

of a hearing prior to deprivation of property is to prevent unfair
and mistaken deprivations of property, such hearing must provide a
real test. (See 16A Am Jur 2d 841 and cases cited thereunder.)
Unusual

circumstances

exist

in

this

case

which

justify

departure from the 25 percent (25%) ceiling on attorney fees.

In

this case the claimant, Mr. Karbakhsh, was accused of taking a
large number of used and some new floppy disk drives suitable for
9

use in personal computers from his employer under circumstances
amounting to theft by deception or a fraudulent taking of property.
The hearing was much more like a criminal trial than like the usual
hearing for unemployment benefits.

The employer called several

witnesses to establish the alleged fraudulent statements made by
the

claimant

and

thereafter

introduced

documents

and

other

witnesses to establish the falsity of the statements to prove the
falsity of the statements made by Mr. Karbakhsh.

The employers

case alone, from the recollection of counsel for the claimant,
involved eight (8) to ten (10) hours of hearing time before any
witnesses were called on behalf of the claimant.
In the Petition for Approval of Fees, Appellant submitted 41.9
hours of actual time.

Most of the time spent by counsel was

involved in the actual 13 hours of hearing in which one or both of
them

were present.

The Administrative

Law Judge allowed

One

Thousand Four Hundred Thirty-six and 50/100 Dollars ($1,436.50) in
total fees.

The hourly rate allowed is Thirty-four and 28/100

Dollars ($34.28) per hour of attorney time.

The fees allowed for

the time expended fall far short of the modest amount requested and
are totally insufficient to justify taking the case, in light of
the usual overhead requirements involved in running a law office.
Since the fees allowed here were so low, there was no possible way
the firm could represent Mr. Karbakhsh on an appeal of the decision
of the Administrative Law Judge.
In

this

prosecutorial

case,

the

proceeding

proceeding

was

akin

in

the

wealthy

which
10

to

that

of

employer

a
as

prosecutor availed itself of many paid witnesses, and a staff of
attorneys to martial the evidence, prepare witnesses, and present
a

well

prepared

case

to

the Administrative

Law

Judge.

Mr.

Karbakhsh on the other hand, with his relatively meager funds,
attempted to defend his rights to unemployment compensation with
skilled counsel hampered, as is usually the case, by his inability
to interview witnesses then employed by WordPerfect Corporation as
well as his lack of funds to be able to secure and interview
witnesses in his favor who had left WordPerfect.

Certainly this

was not a fair hearing where so many exhibits and witnesses were
called and the hearing lasted so long that there was no possible
way for the counsel representing Mr. Karbakhsh to provide adequate
and responsive representation of his interests, even at the modest
level requested, let alone the One Thousand Four Hundred Thirty-six
and 50/100 Dollars ($1,436.50) allowed by the Administrative Law
Judge.
The right to advice and assistance of retained counsel which
is implicit in the concept of due process is eviscerated if there
is no provision for fair compensation in a hearing in which the
employer may dominate the hearing time through the calling of many
paid witnesses while the claimant is denied justice because his
meager resources essentially require that he find counsel willing
to represent him at far less than the usual rate of compensation,
let alone

represent him on an appeal

Administrative Law Judge.

11

from the ruling of the

POINT IV
UNDER SECTION 7 OP ARTICLE I OP THE CONSTITUTION OF UTAH AND THE
FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT TO THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES THE
LIMITATION APPLIED BY THE ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE WAS AN
EFFECTIVE DENIAL OF A PROPERTY WITHOUT DUE PROCESS OF LAW.
The right to advice and assistance of retained counsel in
civil litigation is implicit in the concept of due process.
adversarial

system

indispensable

to

of

justice,

effective

representation

protection

of

by

In an

counsel

individual

is

rights.

Pursuant to Section 7 of Article I of the constitution of the State
of

Utah

and

the

Constitution.
by

the

Fourteenth

Amendment

the

United

States

In this case, the limitation upon the fees allowed

Administrative

Law

Judge

effectively

Karbakhsh from obtaining a fair hearing.
least a relatively level playing field.
of the employer was displayed
hearing.

of

prohibited

Mr.

Fair hearings imply at
In this case, the wealth

in the evidence adduced

at the

There was no possible way for the claimant to compete.

After the employer had presented its case in chief, practically all
of the resources of the claimant were exhausted and there was so
little left that there was no hope of obtaining assistance of
counsel

in

the

prosecution

of

an

appeal

of

the

decision.

Fundamental to the adversarial system of justice is the concept of
champions representing the causes of their clients.

If one is

given unlimited weapons while the other has "one hand tied behind
his back," the fairness of the proceeding must be questioned.
In this

case, allowing

the

employer

to use

any

and

all

resources available while limiting the claimant to fees at 25
percent

(25%)

of the maximum

unemployment
12

entitlement

of

the

claimant, while perhaps understandable as a parental function of
the government to protect claimants from their own improvident
contracts, amounts to a denial of due process.

If the contest is

rigged so there is effectively no chance one of the combatants can
prevail, there can be no fair trial or hearing within the concept
of due process.
CONCLUSION
The Board of Review erred in finding that the hearing before the
Administrative
Appellant

Law Judge

is entitled

lasted

approximately

four

to a reasonable attorney's

(4) hours.
fee and the

attorney's fee awarded by the Board of Review is unreasonably low.
Abraham karbakhsh, the claimant below was denied due process of law
within the meaning of R562-18b-3.5.

Under section 7 of Article I

of the Constitution of Utah and the Fourteenth Amendment to the
Constitution of the United States the limitation applied by the
Administrative Law Judge was an effective denial of a property
without due process of law.
Appellant respectfully requests this Court to reverse the
decision of the Board of Review and to award Appellant attorney's
fees of $4,300.00 or in the alternative to remand the case to the
Board of Review with instructions to amend the attorney's fee award
to be consistent with this Court's opinion.
DATED this 21st day of December, 1992.

.i?(h

*

*• i-w / /
LJLUJC^~
GARV^ & / WEIGHT
Attorney for Appellant

'JENS 'P." FIK&L
Attorney/for Appellant
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MAILING CERTIFICATE
I hereby certify that I mailed, postage prepaid, four (4)
copies of the foregoing Brief of Appellant to Winston M. Faux,
Attorney for Appellee, at P.O. Box 11600, Salt Lake City, UT 84147
this 21st day of December, 1992.
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Utah Administrative Code, R562-18b-3.5
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Utah Code Annotated, §35-4-5(b)(2)
Utah Code Annotated, §63-46b-16(4)(d)
Utah Code Annotated, §63-46b-16(4)(g)
Utah Code Annotated, §78-2a-3(2)
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Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive
fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments
inflicted
A M E N D M E N T IX
[Rights r e t a i n e d by people.]
The enumeration in the Constitution of certain
rights, shall not be construed to deny or disparage
others retained by the people

majority then from the two h ghest numbers on the
list the Senate shall choose the Vice President a
quorum for the purpose shall consist of two thirds of
the whole number of Senators and a majority of the
whole number shall be necessary to a choice But no
person constitutionally ineligible to the office of Pres
ident shall be eligible to that of Vice President of the
United States
AMENDMENT XIII
Section

AMENDMENT X
[ P o w e r s r e s e r v e d to s t a t e s o r people.l
The powers not delegated to the United States by
the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States,
are reserved to the States respectively, or to the people
A M E N D M E N T XI
[Suits against s t a t e s — Restriction of judicial
power.l
The judicial power of the United States shall not be
construed to extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the United
States by Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or
Subjects of any Foreign State
AMENDMENT XII
[Election of President and Vice-President]
The Electors shall meet in their respective states,
and vote by ballot for President and Vice-President,
one of whom, at least, shall not be an inhabitant of
the same state with themselves, they shall name in
their ballots the person voted for as President, and in
distinct ballots the person voted for as Vice-President, and they shall make distinct lists of all persons
voted for as President, and of all persons voted for as
Vice-President, and of the number of votes for each,
which lists they shall sign and certify, and transmit
sealed to the seat of the Government of the United
States, directed to the President of the Senate,—The
President of the Senate shall, in the presence of the
Senate and House of Representatives, open all the
certificates and the votes shall then be counted,—The
person having the greatest number of votes for President, shall be the President, if such number be a majority of the whole number of Electors appointed, and
if no person have such majority, then from the persons having the highest numbers not exceeding three
on the list of those voted for as President, the House
of Representatives shall choose immediately, by ballot, the President But in choosing the President, the
votes shall be taken by states, the representation
from each state having one vote, a quorum for this
purpose shall consist of a member or members from
two-thirds of the states, and a majority of all the
states shall be necessary to a choice And if the House
of Representatives shall not choose a President whenever the right of choice shall devolve upon them, before the fourth day of March next following, then the
Vice-President shall act as President, as in the case of
the death or other constitutional disability of the
President —The person having the greatest number
of votes as Vice-President, shall be the Vice-President, if such number be a majonty of the whole number of Electors appointed, and if no person have a

1 [Slavery prohibited ]
2 [Power to enforce amendment ]
Section 1. [Slavery prohibited.]
Neither slavery nor involuntary servitude, except
as a punishment for crime whereof the party shall
have been duly convicted, shall exist within the
United States, or any place subject to their jurisdiction
Sec. 2. [Power to enforce a m e n d m e n t ]
Congress shall have power to enforce this article by
appropriate legislation
AMENDMENT XIV
Section
1 [Citizenship — Due process of law — Equal protection ]
2 [Representatives — Power to reduce appointment 1
3 [Disqualification to hold office ]
4 [Public debt not to be questioned — Debts of the
Confederacy and claims not to be
paid ]
5 [Power to enforce amendment ]
Section 1. [Citizenship — Due process of law —
Equal protection.]
All persons born or naturalized in the United
States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein
they reside No State shall make or enforce any law
which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of
citizens of the United States, nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without
due process of law, nor deny to any person within its
jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws
Sec. 2.

[Representatives — Power to reduce appointment]
Representatives shall be apportioned among the
several States according to their respective numbers,
counting the whole number of persons in each State,
excluding Indians not taxed But when the right to
vote at any election for the choice of electors for President and Vice-President of the United States, Representatives in Congress, the Executive and Judicial
Officers of a State, or the members of the Legislature
thereof, is denied to any of the male inhabitants of
such State, being twenty-one years of age, and citizens of the United States, or in any way abndged,
except for participation in rebellion, or other crime,
the basis of representation therein shall be reduced in
the proportion which the number of such male citizens shall bear to the whole number of male citizens
twenty-one years of age in such State
Sec. 3. [Disqualification to hold office.]
No person shall be a Senator or Representative in
Congress, or Elector of President and Vice President,

Section
24 [Uniform operation of laws ]
25 [Rights retained by people ]
26 [Provisions mandatory and prohibitory I
27 [Fundamental r i g h t s ]

CONSTITUTION OF UTAH
PREAMBLE
Article
I
II
III
IV
V
VI
VII
VIII
IX
X
XI
XII
XIII
XIV
XV
XVI
XVII
XVIII
XIX
XX
XXI
XXII
XXIII
XXIV

Declaration of Rights
State Boundaries
Ordinance
Elections and Right of Suffrage
Distribution of Powers
Legislative Department
Executive Department
Judicial Department
Congressional and Legislative Apportionment
Education
Counties, Cities and Towns
Corporations
Revenue and Taxation
Public Debt

Section 1. [Inherent and inalienable rights.]
All men have the inherent and inalienable right to
enjoy and defend their lives and liberties, to acquire,
possess and protect property, to worship according to
the dictates of their consciences, to assemble peaceably, protest against wrongs, and petition for redress
of grievances, to communicate freely their thoughts
and opinions, being responsible for the abuse of that
right

1896

Sec. 2.

[All political p o w e r inherent in the people.]
All political power is inherent in the people, and all
free governments are founded on their authority for
their equal protection and benefit, and they have the
right to alter or reform their government a*, the public welfare may require
1896

Militia

Labor
Water Rights
Forestry
Public Buildings and State Institutions
Public Lands
Salaries
Miscellaneous
Amendment and Revision
Schedule

Sec. 3. [Utah inseparable from the Union.]
The State of Utah is an inseparable part of the
Federal Union and the Constitution of the United
States is the supreme law of the land
1896
Sec. 4.

PREAMBLE
Grateful to Almighty God for life and liberty, we,
the people of Utah, in order to secure and perpetuate
the principles of free government, do ordain and establish this CONSTITUTION
1896
ARTICLE I
DECLARATION OF RIGHTS
Section
1 [Inherent and inalienable rights J
2 [All political power inherent in the people ]
3 [Utah inseparable from the Union 1
4 [Religious liberty — No property qualification to
vote or hold office J
5 [Habeas corpus )
6 [Right to bear arms 1
7 [Due process of law 1
8 [Offenses bailable ]
9 [Excessive bail and fines — Cruel punishments 1
10 [Trial by jury 1
11 [Courts open — Redress of injuries ]
12 [Rights of accused persons ]
13 [Prosecution by information or indictment —
Grand jury J
14 [Unreasonable searches forbidden — Issuance of
warrant ]
15 [Freedom of speech and of the press — Libel ]
16 I No imprisonment for debt — Exception }
17 [Elections to be free — Soldiers voting J
18 | Attainder — Ex post facto laws — Impairing
contracts [
19 I Treason defined — Proof )
20 |Military subordinate to the civil power ]
21 [Slavery forbidden 1
22 [Private property for public use )
23 [Irrevocable franchises forbidden J

[Religious liberty — No property qualification to vote or hold office.
The rights of conscience shall never be infringed
The State shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion or prohibiting the free exercise
thereof, no religious test shall be required as a qualification for any office of public trust or for ar y vote at
any election, nor shall any person be incompetent as
a witness or juror on account of religious belief or the
absence thereof There shall be no union o" Church
and State, nor shall any church dominate the State or
interfere with its functions No public mone> or property shall be appropriated for or applied to any religious worship, exercise or instruction, or for the support of any ecclesiastical establishment No property
qualification shall be required of any person to vote,
or hold office, except as provided in this Consi ltution
1896

Sec. 5. [ H a b e a s c o r p u s . ]
The privilege of the writ of habeas corpus >hall not
be suspended, unless, in case of rebellion or invasion,
the public safety requires it
1896
Sec. 6. [Right to b e a r a r m s . ]
The individual n g h t of the people to keep and bear
arms for security and defense of self, family, others,
property, or the state, as well as for other lawful purposes shall not be infringed, but nothing herein shall
prevent the legislature from defining the lawful use
of arms
1984
Sec. 7. [Due p r o c e s s of law.]
No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property, without due process of law
1896
Sec. 8. [Offenses bailable.]
(1) All persons charged with a crime shall be bailable except
(a) persons charged with a capital offense
when there is substantial evidence to supDort the
charge, or
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\u; persons cnargea witn a telony while on pro
bation or parole, or while free on bail awaiting
trial on a previous felony charge when there is
substantial evidence to support the new felony
charge or
(c) persons charged with any other crime des
ignated by statute as one for which bail may be
denied, if there is substantial evidence to support
the charge and the court finds by clear and con
vincing evidence that the person would consti
tute a substantial danger to any other person or
to the community or is likely to flee the junsdic
tion of the court if released on bail
(2) Persons convicted of a crime are bailable pend
ing appeal only as prescribed by law
1988
Sec. 9.

[Excessive bail and fines — Cruel punishments ]
Excessive bail shall not be required, excessive fines
shall not be imposed, nor shall cruel and unusual
punishments be inflicted Persons arrested or imprisoned shall not be treated with unnecessary rigor 1896
Sec. 10. [Trial b y j u r y ]
In capital cases the right of trial by jury shall remain inviolate In courts of general jurisdiction except in capital cases, a jury shall consist of eight jurors In courts of inferior jurisdiction a jury shall consist of four jurors In criminal cases the verdict shall
be unanimous In civil cases three-fourths of the jurors may find a verdict A jury in civil cases shall be
waived unless demanded
1896
Sec. 11. [ C o u r t s o p e n — Redress of injuries.l
All courts shall be open, and every person, for an
injury done to him in his person, property or reputation, shall have remedy by due course of law, which
shall be administered without denial or unnecessary
delay, and no person shall be barred from prosecuting
or defending before any tribunal m this State, by
himself or counsel, any civil cause to which he is a
party

1896

Sec. 12. [Rights of a c c u s e d persons.]
In criminal prosecutions the accused shall have the
right to appear and defend in person and by counsel,
to demand the nature and cause of the accusation
against him, to have a copy thereof, to testify in his
own behalf, to be confronted by the witnesses against
him, to have compulsory process to compel the attendance of witnesses in his own behalf, to have a speedy
public trial by an impartial jury of the county or district in which the offense is alleged to have been committed, and the right to appeal in all cases In no
instance shall any accused person, before final judgment, be compelled to advance money or fees to secure the rights herein guaranteed The accused shall
not be compelled to give evidence against himself, a
wife shall not be compelled to testify against her husband, nor a husband against his wife, nor shall any
person be twice put in jeopardy for the same offense
1896

Sec. 13.

[Prosecution by information or indictment — Grand jury.]
Offenses heretofore required to be prosecuted by
indictment, shall be prosecuted by information after
examination and commitment by a magistrate, unless t h e examination be waived by the accused with
the consent of the State, or by indictment, with or
without such examination and commitment The formation of the grand jury and the powers and duties
thereofshall be as prescnbed by the Legislature 1947

Sec

14.

[Unreasonable searches forbidden —
I s s u a n c e of w a r r a n t 1
The right of the people to be secure in their per
sons houses papers and effects against unreasonable
searches and seizures shall not be violated and no
warrant shall issue but upon probable cause sup
ported by oath or affirmation particularly describing
the place to be searched and the person or thing to be
seized
1896
Sec 15

[Freedom of s p e e c h a n d of t h e p r e s s —
Libel]
No law shall be passed to abridge or restrain the
freedom of speech or of the press In all criminal pros
ecutions for libel the truth may be given in evidence
to the jury, and if it shall appear to the jurv that the
matter charged as libelous is true and was published
with good motives, and for justifiable ends the party
shall be acquitted, and the jury shall have the right
to determine the law and the fact
1896
Sec 16.

[No i m p r i s o n m e n t for d e b t — E x c e p tion ]
There shall be no imprisonment for debt except in
cases of absconding debtors
1896
Sec. 17. [Elections to b e free — Soldiers v o t i n g ]
All elections shall be free and no power civil or
military, shall at any time interfere to prevent the
free exercise of the right of suffrage Soldiers in time
of war, may vote at their post of duty, in or out of the
State, under regulations to be prescribed by law 1896
Sec. 18.

[Attainder — E x p o s t facto l a w s — Impairing contracts.]
No bill of attainder, ex post facto law, or law lm
pairing the obligation of contracts shall be passed
1896

Sec. 19. [Treason defined — Proof.]
Treason against the State shall consist only in
levying war against it, or in adhering to its enemies
or in giving them aid and comfort No person shall be
convicted of treason unless on the testimony of two
witnesses to the same overt act
1896
Sec. 20.

[Military subordinate to the civil
power.]
The military shall be in strict subordination to the
civil power, and no soldier in time of peace, shall be
quartered in any house without the consent of the
owner, nor in time of war except in a manner to be
prescribed by law
1896
Sec. 21. [Slavery forbidden.]
Neither slavery nor involuntary servitude, except
as a punishment for crime, whereof the party shall
have been duly convicted, shall exist within this
State
1896
Sec. 22. [Private property for public u s e ]
Private property shall not be taken or damaged for
public use without just compensation
1896
Sec. 23. [Irrevocable franchises forbidden.]
No law shall be passed granting irrevocably any
franchise, privilege or immunity
1896
Sec. 24. [Uniform operation of laws.]
All laws of a general nature shall have uniform
operation
1896
Sec. 25. [Rights retained by people.]
This enumeration of rights shall not be construed
to impair or deny others retained by the people
1896

including Section 5(e) overpayments ana employer liabilities Including interest and penalties which have not
been collected within eight years after the issuance of a
warrant will be written oft, unless payments are being
received consistent with an Installment agreement or
court order. All collection or offset action shall cease.
The debt will be forgiven and forgotten as though no
such debt ever existed and it will be removed from the
Department records. When an overpayment for fraud
established under Section 6(e) is removedfromDepartment record*, the claimant may receive waiting week
credit and (Viture benefits may be paid without reference to the prior Section 6(e) overpayment
KEY: unemployment compensation, ovvrptymeaU*
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R562-18b. Approval of Counsel Fees.
R562-18b-L General Definition.
R562-18b-2. Procedure.
R562-18b-3. Criteria for Evaluation of Fee Petition.
R562-18b-4. Appeal Rights.
R562-18b-l. General Definition.
The intent of Section 35-4-18(b) is to protect the interests of the claimant who Is dependent on his benefits as
a means of livelihood during his period of unemploym e n t The Act does not address fees charged to employera by their representatives as employers are deemed to
be more knowledgeable in the marketplace and generally not in need of such safeguards.
R£62-18b-l. Procedure.
If a fee is to be charged a written petition for approval
of fee must be submitted by the claimant's representative to the Administrative Law Judge before whom the
representative appeared, or to the ChiefAdministrative
Law Judge if no hearing was scheduled. An approval
form can be obtained through the appeals office. The fee
may be approved as requested or a lesser amount may
be approved depending upon the appropriateness and
justification of the request
R 6 6 2 - 1 8 b - 3 . Criteria for E v a l u a t i o n of Fee
Petition.
The appropriateness of the fee will be determined
baaed on the following criteria:
1. Complexity of Issues Involved
A case involving several complex issues would obviously require greater preparation. However, services
performed which add nothing to the presentation of the
case are to be avoided. For example: A simple case having only one legal issue such as a voluntary quit would
not normally require more than two hours of preparation time. The same is true for most work search issues.
2. Time Actually Spent In:
a. preparation of the case
b. attending the hearing
c. preparation of a brief (if required)
A brief should be submitted only when requested or
approved by the Administrative Law Judge. If a brief is
submitted which is not requested or necessary, the
approved fee may be reduced by the charges for time
spent on the brief.

3. Quality of Service Rendered
a. preparedness of the representative
b. organization and presentation of the case
c. avoidance of undue delays
Documents and witnesses should be made available
at the time scheduled for the hearing and postponements should not be required except in unusual circumstances. Every effort should be msde to go forward with
the hearing when it is originally scheduled especially in
benefit cases as claimants sre frequently entirely without income during the course of the appeal processes if
benefits have been denied or if benefits have been
allowed, excessive overpayments nay be created. In
recognition of the due process right for payment when
due, the Department of Labor has established a federal
standard requiring that 60% of all appeals decisions be
issued within 30 days of the date the appeal is filed.
Therefore, unnecessary delays justify a reduction in the
approved fee to the representative.
d. necessity of representation
If it is clearly demonstrated that the claimant was not
in need of representation because of the simplicity of
the case or the lack of preparation on the part of the
representative only a minimal fee may be approved.
4. Prevailing Fee
The prevailing fee is the rate charged by others for the
same type of service. In determining the prevailing fee
for the service rendered, credence vrill be given to information obtained from the Utah State Bar Association,
Lawyer's Referral Service, or oth >r similar organizations as well aa determinations previously rendered by
the Appeals Tribunal
6. Limitation on Amount of the Fee
Fees will not be approved in excess of 25% of the
claimant's maximum unemployment benefit entitlement unless such a limitation would preclude the
claimant from pursuing an appeal to the Supreme
Court or would preclude in some other way an opportunity for due process.
R56218b-4. Appeal Rights.
Should the representative disagree with the ruling of
the Administrative Law Judge, a vrritten appeal may be
made to the Board of Review witliin ten days from the
date of Issuance of the decision. This appeal must set
forth the grounds upon which the complaint Is made.
KEY: un«mploym«f)t eomjxoMtlo*, counselors

R56249a. Prosecution.
R562-19a-l. General Definition.
R562-19a-2. Guidelines for Referring Cases of Frsud to
the Courte.
R562-19a-l. General Definition
The intent of this section of the Act is to assess penal*
ties beyond those administered by the Department as
provided by Section 35-4-5(e). AJI it would be impractical and beyond the intent of the law to prosecute all
cases of fraud in the courts, it is left to the Department
to determine which cases will be presented to the courM^ ^ ^ for addition*! civil penaltii*. A Pro*»ecution BoaW" "^ • «&
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(a) For the week in which the claimant left
work voluntarily without good cause, if so found
by the commission, and for each week thereafter
until the claimant has performed services in
bona fide, covered employment and earned wages
for those services equal to at least six times the
claimant's weekly benefit amount. A claimant
shall not be denied eligibility for benefits if the
claimant leaves work under circumstances of
such a nature that it would be contrary to equity
and good conscience to impose a disqualification.
The commission shall, in cooperation with the
employer, consider for the purposes of this chapter the reasonableness of the claimant's actions,
and the extent to which the actions evidence a
genuine continuing attachment to the labor market in reaching a determination of whether the
ineligibility of a claimant is contrary to equity
and good conscience.
Notwithstanding any other provision of this
section, a claimant who has left work voluntarily
to accompany, follow, or join his or her spouse to
or in a new locality does so without good cause
for purposes of this subsection.
(b) (1) For the week in which the claimant
was discharged for just cause or for an act or
omission in connection with employment,
not constituting a crime, which is deliberate,
willful, or wanton and adverse to the employer's rightful interest, if so found by the
commission, and thereafter until the claimant has earned an amount equal to at least
six times the claimant's weekly benefit
amount in bona fide covered employment.
(2) For the week in which he was discharged for dishonesty constituting a crime
or any felony or class A misdemeanor in connection with his work as shown by the facts,
together with his admission, or as shown by
his conviction in a court of competent jurisdiction of that crime and for the 51 next following weeks and for each week thereafter
until the claimant has performed services in
bona fide covered employment and earned
wages for those services equal to at least six
times the claimant's weekly benefit amount.
If by reason of his alleged dishonesty or
crime in connection with his work, the individual is held in legal custody or is free on
bail, any determination of his eligibility
shall be held in abeyance pending his release
or conviction.
(c) If the commission finds that the claimant
has failed without good cause to properly apply
for available suitable work, to accept a referral to
suitable work offered by the employment office,
or to accept suitable work offered by an employer
or the employment office. The ineligibility continues until the claimant has performed services
in bona fide covered employment and earned
wages for the services in an amount equal to at
least six times the claimant's weekly benefit
amount. A claimant shall not be denied eligibility for benefits for failure to apply, accept referral, or accept available suitable work under circumstances of such a nature that it would be contrary to equity and good conscience to impose a
disqualification.
The commission shall consider the purposes of
this chapter, the reasonableness of the claimant's
actions, and the extent to which the actions evidence a genuine continuing attachment to the
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labor market in reaching a determination of
whether the ineligibility of a claimant is contrary to equity and good conscience.
(1) In determining whether or not work is
suitable for an individual, the commission
shall consider the degree of risk involved to
his health, safety, and morals, his physical
fitness and prior training, his prior earnings
and experience, his length of unemployment
and prospects for securing local work in his
customary occupation, the wages for similar
work in the locality, and the distance of the
available work from his residence.
Prior earnings shall be considered on the
basis of all four quarters used in establishing
eligibility and not just the earnings from the
most recent employer. The commission shall
be more prone to find work as suitable the
longer the claimant has been unemployed
and the less likely the prospects are to secure
local work in his customary occupation.
(2) Notwithstanding any other provision
of this chapter, no work is suitable, and benefits shall not be denied under this chapter
to any otherwise eligible individual for refusing to accept new work under any of the
following conditions:
(i) if the position offered is vacant due
directly to a strike, lockout, or other
labor dispute;
(ii) if the wages, hours, or other conditions of the work offered are substantially less favorable to the individual
than those prevailing for similar work
in the locality; or
(iii) if as a condition of being employed the individual would be required
to join a company union or to resign
from or refrain from joining any bona
fide labor organization,
(d) For any week in which the commission
finds that his unemployment is due to a stoppage
of work which exists because of a strike involving
his grade, class, or group of workers at the factory or establishment at which he is or was last
employed.
(1) If the commission finds that a strike
has been fomented by a worker of any employer, none of the workers of the grade,
class, or group of workers of the individual
who is found to be a party to the plan, or
agreement to foment a strike, shall be eligible for benefits. However, if the commission
finds that the strike is caused by the failure
or refusal of any employer to conform to the
provisions of any law of the state of Utah or
of the United States pertaining to hours,
wages, or other conditions of work, the strike
shall not render the workers ineligible for
benefits.
(2) If the commission finds that the employer, his agent or representative has conspired, planned, or agreed with any of his
workers, their agents or representatives to
foment a strike, that strike shall not render
the workers ineligible for benefits.
(3) A worker may receive benefits if, subsequent to his unemployment because of a
strike as defined in Subsection (d), he has
obtained employment and has been paid
wages of not less than the amount specified
in Subsection 35-4-3(d) and has worked as
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(b) Venue for judicial review of informal adjudicative proceedings shall be as provided in the
statute governing the agency or, in the absence
of such a venue provision, in the county where
the petitioner resides or maintains his principal
place of business.
(2) (a) The petition for judicial review of informal
adjudicative proceedings shall be a complaint
governed by the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure
and shall include:
(i) the name and mailing address of the
party seeking judicial review;
(ii) the name and mailing address of the
respondent agency;
(iii) the title and date of the final agency
action to be reviewed, together with a duplicate copy, summary, or brief description of
the agency action;
(iv) identification of the persons who were
parties in the informal adjudicative proceedings that led to the agency action;
(v) a copy of the written agency order from
the informal proceeding;
(vi) facts demonstrating that the party
seeking judicial review is entitled to obtain
judicial review;
(vii) a request for relief, specifying the
type and extent of relief requested;
(viii) a statement of the reasons why the
petitioner is entitled to relief.
(b) All additional pleadings and proceedings in
the district court are governed by the Utah Rules
of Civil Procedure.
(3) (a) The district court, without a jury, shall determine all questions of fact and law and any
constitutional issue presented in the pleadings.
(b) The Utah Rules of Evidence apply in judicial proceedings under this section.
1990
63-46b-16.

Judicial review — Formal adjudicative p r o c e e d i n g s .
(1) As provided by statute, the Supreme Court or
the Court of Appeals has jurisdiction to review all
final agency action resulting from formal adjudicative proceedings.
(2) (a) To seek judicial review of final agency action resulting from formal adjudicative proceedings, the petitioner shall file a petition for review
of agency action with the appropriate appellate
court in the form required by the appellate rules
of the appropriate appellate court.
(b) The appellate rules of the appropriate appellate court shall govern all additional filings
and proceedings in the appellate court.
(3) The contents, transmittal, and filing of the
agency's record for judicial review of formal adjudicative proceedings are governed by the Utah Rules of
Appellate Procedure, except that:
(a) all parties to the review proceedings may
stipulate to shorten, summarize, or organize the
record;
(b) the appellate court may tax the cost of preparing transcripts and copies for the record:
(i) against a party who unreasonably refuses to stipulate to shorten, summarize, or
organize the record; or
(ii) according to any other provision of
law.
(4) The appellate court shall grant relief only if, on
the basis of the agency's record, it determines t h a t a
person seeking judicial review has been substantially
prejudiced by any of the following:

69?

(a) the agency action, or the statute or rule on
which the agency action is based, is unconstitutional on its face or as applied;
(b) the agency has acted beyond the jurisdic
tion conferred by any statute;
(c) the agency has not decided all of the issues
requiring resolution;
(d) the agency has erroneously interpreted or
appliec the law;
(e) the agency has engaged in an unlawful procedure or decision-making process, or has failed
to follow prescribed procedure;
(f) the persons taking the agency action were
illegally constituted as a decision-making body
or were subject to disqualification;
(g) the agency action is based upon a determination of fact, made or implied by the agency,
that is not supported by substantial evidence
when viewed in light of the whole record before
the couil;
(h) thg agency action is:
(i) an abuse of the discretion delegated to
the agency by statute;
(ii) contrary to a rule of the agency;
(iii) contrary to the agency's prior practice, unless the agency justifies the inconsistency by giving facts and reasons that demonstrate a fair and rational basis for the inconsistency; or
(iv) otherwise arbitrary or capricious. 1988
63-46b-17. J u d i c i a l r e v i e w — T y p e of relief.
(1) (a) In either the review of informal adjudicative proceedings by the district court or the review of fonnal adjudicative proceedings by an ap^
pellate court, the court may award damages orf
compensai,ion only to the extent expressly autho^
rized by statute.
(b) In granting relief, the court may:
(i) order agency action required by law?
(ii) order the agency to exercise its discrei
tion as required by law;
(iii) set aside or modify agency action; £a
(iv) enjoin or stay the effective date of'
agenc> action; or
(v) remand the matter to the agency for
further proceedings.
-4e
(2) Decisions on petitions for judicial review of
final agency a d ion are reviewable by a higher court,
if authorized by statute.
1987
63-46b-18.

J u d i c i a l r e v i e w — S t a y a n d other
t e m p o r a r y r e m e d i e s p e n d i n g final disposition.
(1) Unless precluded by another statute, the
agency may g r a i t a stay of its order or other temporary remedy duiing the pendency of judicial review,
according to the agency's rules.
(2) Parties shall petition the agency for a stay or
other temporary remedies unless extraordinary circumstances require immediate judicial intervention.
(3) If the agency denies a stay or denies other temporary remedies requested by a party, the agency's
order of denial shall be mailed to all parties and shall
specify the reasons why the stay or other temporary
remedy was not granted.
(4) If the agency has denied a stay or other temporary remedy to protect the public health, safety, or
welfare against a substantial threat, the court may
not grant a stay or other temporary remedy unless it

finds that:

78-2-3

JUDICIAL CODE

(4) The Supreme Court may transfer to the C o u r t
of Appeals any of the matters over which the g u _
preme Court has original appellate jurisdiction, ex _
cept:
(a) capitaf felony convictions or an appeal 0 f
an interlocutory order of a court of record inv 0 j v _
ing a charge of a capital felony;
(b) election and voting contests;
(c) reapportionment of election districts;
(d) retention or removal of public officers; ^ n c j
(e) those matters described in Subsecti Q n s
(3)(a) through (d).
(5) The Supreme Court has sole discretion m
granting or denying a petition for writ of certior a r j
for the review of a Court of Appeals adjudication, ^ u ^
the Supreme Court shall review those cases certif ie( j
to it by the Court of Appeals under Subsection (3)(b).
(6) The Supreme Court shall comply with the re _
quirements of Title 63, Chapter 46b, in its review 0 f
agency adjudicative proceedings.
^992
78-2-3.

Repealed.
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78-2-4.

S u p r e m e Court — Rulemaking, judges
pro tempore, and practice of law.
(1) The Supreme Court shall adopt rules of p r Q c e .
dure and evidence for use in the courts of the state
and shall by rule manage the appellate process. ^ h e
Legislature may amend the rules of procedure ^ n ( j
evidence adopted by the Supreme Court upon a v 0 te
of two-thirds of all members of both houses of the
Legislature.
(2) Except as otherwise provided by the Utah C o n .
stitution, the Supreme Court by rule may a u t h o ^ z e
retired justices and judges and judges pro tempor^ ^
perform any judicial duties. Judges pro tempore s ^ a u
be citizens of the United States, Utah residents, ^ n c j
admitted to practice law in Utah.
(3) The Supreme Court shall by rule govern the
practice of law, including admission to practice \avf
and the conduct and discipline of persons admitted to
the practice of law.
l986
78-2-5.

Repealed.

l988

78-2-6. Appellate court administrator.
The appellate court administrator shall a p p ^ n t
clerks and support staff as necessary for the o p e r a ^ o n
of the Supreme Court and the Court of Appeals. ^ e
duties of the clerks and support staff shall be established by the appellate court administrator, ^nd
powers established by rule of the Supreme Court.
1986

78-2-7.

Repealed.

1986

78-2-7.5. Service of sheriff to court.
The court may at any time require the attendance
and services t>f#7?y sheriff in thestete.
1988
78-2-8 to 78-2-14.

Repealed.

1986, \988

C H A P T E R 2a
COURT OF A P P E A L S
Section
78-2a-l.
78-2a-2.
78-2a-3.
78-2a-4.
78-2a-5.

Creation — Seal.
Number of judges — Terms — F u n c t i o n s
— Filing fees.
Court of Appeals jurisdiction.
Review of actions by Supreme C o u ^
Location of Court of Appeals.

282

78-2a-l. C r e a t i o n — Seal.
There is created a court known as the Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals is a court of record and
shall have a seal.
jggg
78-2a-2.

N u m b e r of j u d g e s — T e r m s — Functions — Filing fees.
(1) The Court of Appeals consists of seven judges.
The term of appointment to office as a judge of the
Court of Appeals is until the first general election
held more than three years after the effective date of
the appointment. Thereafter, the term of office of a
judge of the Court of Appeals is six years and commences on the first Monday in January, next following the date of election. A judge whose term expires
may serve, upon request of the Judicial Council, until
a successor is appointed and qualified. The presiding
judge of the Court of Appeals shall receive as additional compensation $1,000 per annum or fraction
thereof for the period served.
(2) The Court of Appeals shall sit and render judgment in panels of three judges. Assignment to panels
shall be by random rotation of all judges of the Court
of Appeals. The Court of Appeals by rule shall provide for the selection of a chair for each panel. The
Court of Appeals may not sit en banc.
(3) The judges of the Court of Appeals shall elect a
presiding judge from among the members of the court
by majority vote of all judges. The term of office of the
presiding judge is two years and until a successor is
elected. A presiding judge of the Court of Appeals
may serve in that office no more than two successive
terms. The Court of Appeals may by rule provide for
an acting presiding judge to serve in the absence or
incapacity of the presiding judge.
(4) The presiding judge may be removed from the
office of presiding judge by majority vote of all judges
of the Court of Appeals. In addition to the duties of a
judge of the Court of Appeals, the presiding judge
shall:
(a) administer the rotation and scheduling of
panels;
(b) act as liaison with the Supreme Court;
(c) call and preside over the meetings of the
Court of Appeals; and
(d) carry out duties prescribed by the Supreme
Court and the Judicial Council.
(5) Filing fees for the Court of Appeals are the
same as for the Supreme Court.
1988
78-2a-3. Court of Appeals jurisdiction.
(1) The Court of Appeals has jurisdiction to issue
all extraordinary writs and to issue all writs and process necessary:
T?
(a) to carry into effect its judgments, orders,
and decrees; or
(b) in aid of its jurisdiction.
(2) The Court of Appeals has appellate jurisdiction,
including jurisdiction of interlocutory appeals, oven
(a) the final orders and decrees resulting from
formal adjudicative proceedings of state agencies
or appeals from the district court review of informal adjudicative proceedings of the agencies, ex?
cept the Public Service Commission, State Taic
Commission, Board of State Lands, Board of Oik
Gas, and Mining, and the state engineer; >j$
(b) appeals from the district court review p£
(i) adjudicative proceedings of a g e n c i e s ^
political subdivisions of the state or other taj
cai agencies; and
(ii) a challenge to agency action und«l
Section 63-46a-12.1;

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
The Board of Review erred in finding that the hearing before
the Administrative Law Judge lasted approximately four (4) hours.
The record clearly demonstrates that the total time in hearings was
13 hours and that the total time between the Appellant's two
attorney's was approximately 23 hours.
The Board of Review awarded an unreasonably low attorney's
fee.

In this case, Appellant spent a combined total of 41.9 hours

from the time they were retained by Mr. Karbakhsh to and including
the

decision

of

the

Department

of

Employment

Security.

Mr.

Karbakhsh agreed to retain counsel for the sum of Four Thousand
Three Hundred Dollars ($4,300.00).
The claimant, Abraham Karbakhsh, was denied due process of law
within the meaning of R562-18B-3.5. The Administrative Code allows
for

a

waiver

of

attorney's fees.
the 25 percent

the

25

percent

(25%)

ceiling

on

allowable

Due process considerations require a waiver of
(25%) ceiling and

further require an award of

attorney's fees consistent with Appellant's claims.
Under Section 7 of Article I of the Constitution of Utah and
the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States,
the limitation applied by the Administrative Law Judge was an
effective denial of a property without due process of law.
right

to

advice

litigation
adversarial

and

assistance

is implicit
system

of

of

retained

counsel

in civil

in the concept of due process.
justice,

representation

by

In an

counsel

indispensable to effective protection of individual rights.
4(a)

The

is

DETERMINATIVE STATUTES
The determinative statutes cited herein are as follows and are
set forth in their entirety in the Addendum of this brief.
Constitution of the United States, Fourteenth
Amendment, Section 1
Constitution of Utah, Section 7 Article I
Utah Administrative Code, R562-18b-3.5
Utah Code Annotated, §35-4-5(b)(1)
Utah Code Annotated, §35-4-5(b)(2)
Utah Code Annotated, §63-46b-16(4)(d)
Utah Code Annotated, §63-46b-16(4)(g)
Utah Code Annotated, §78-2a-3(2)

2(a)

